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Competition of different evaluation schemes in the continuous variable game
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An asymmetric generalization of classical Cournot’s duopoly game was introduced and the simula-
tion scheme of its quantized version was analyzed. In this scheme, the player assigned by a ’classical’
measurement scheme always wins the player assigned by a quantum measurement scheme. It was
shown that the fluctuation causes the disadvantage game rule of the player measured by the quantum
apparatus in this specific case.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION OF ASYMMETRIC
GENERALIZATION OF CLASSICAL
COURNOT’s DUOPOLY
Significant interest has been focused on quantum
games [1–12], a new born branch of quantum information
theory, which can exploit both quantum superposition
[1, 3] and quantum entanglement [2, 4]. Among them,
asymmetric quantum games have also been investigated
[13–15]. Some previous studies on the asymmetric quan-
tum games have revealed the player utilizing quantum
strategies has the advantage than the one only using clas-
sical strategies [15]. The role of quantum correlation or
classical correlation on the quantum Prisoner’s dilemma
has also been investigated [16], and the influence of quan-
tum fluctuations on quantum games has been discussed
[17]. However, there is still very little attention focusing
on the asymmetric quantum games in which the asymme-
try is caused by different measurement schemes or eval-
uation schemes assigned to different players.
Recently, a simulation scheme without any entan-
glement involved of quantized Cournot’s Duopoly has
been presented[18], which is different from the quanti-
zation scheme containing the intermediate entanglement
in Ref.[19]. It has been shown that the scheme using clas-
sical measuring apparatus is advantage to the one using
the quantum measuring apparatus [18]. Here, we will
analyze its asymmetric version in which two firms are
assigned as different measurement schemes or evaluation
schemes. Firstly, let us introduce an asymmetric gener-
alization of classical Cournot’s duopoly game [20], two
firms simultaneously decide the quantities q1 (q1 ≥ 0)
and q2 (q2 ≥ 0) respectively, of a homogeneous product
released on the market. Two firms have different execu-
tion precisions for their strategies. Assuming the firm 1
can definitely execute its strategy without any possible
deviation, and the firm 2 can only execute its strategy
with outcomes η2 ∈ N probabilistically distributing on
the set of the nonnegative integer with the probability
distribution function D(q2, η2) which has the constraint
condition
∑∞
η2=0
D(q2, η2) = 1 and the expected value
q2 given by q2 =
∑∞
η2=0
η2D(q2, η2). The distribution
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D(q2, η2) of the firm 2 is common knowledge. Suppose Λ
is the total quantity, i.e., Λ = q1 + η2, and the market-
clearing price is given by P (Λ) = a − Λ for Λ ≤ a and
P (Λ) = 0 for Λ > a. The unit cost of producing the
product is assumed to be c with c < a. In the extreme
case with a → ∞ and c → ∞ but keeping k = a − c a
finite nonnegative constant, the average payoff functions
of two firms can be obtained as
u1(q1, q2) =
∞∑
η2=0
q1[P (Λ)− c]D(q2, η2)
= q1[k − (q1 + q2)]
u2(q1, q2) =
∞∑
η2=0
η2[P (Λ)− c]D(q2, η2)
= q2[k − (q1 + q2)]−∆2η2 (1)
where
∆η2 = {[
∞∑
η2=0
η22D(q2, η2)]− q22}
1
2 (2)
is the standard deviation of η2. For clarifying the role
of statistical phenomenon of the optical field in the later
simulation scheme of this kind of the game, adopting the
Mandel-Q parameter Q(q2) ≡ ∆
2η2
q2
− 1 [21], which is re-
lated with the second order intensity correlation function
g(2)(0) via g(2)(0) = Q(q2)+q2
q2
, the above average payoff
function can be rewritten as
u1(q1, q2) = q1[k − (q1 + q2)]
u2(q1, q2) = q2[k − (q1 + q2 +Q(q2) + 1)]. (3)
It explicitly shows the asymmetry of this game increases
with the Mandel-Q parameter.
In the above game, a strategy profile {q∗1 , q∗2} is a Nash
equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by firm
1 or 2 is profitable for firm 1 or 2, respectively, that are
u1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) > u1(q1, q
∗
2) and u2(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) > u1(q
∗
1 , q2) holding
for any q1 6= q∗1 and q2 6= q∗2 [22]. Since ∂
2u1
∂q2
1
= −2 < 0
and ∂
2u2
∂q2
2
= −2 − ∂2∆2η2
∂q2
2
, Nash equilibrium condition is
∂u1
∂q1
= ∂u2
∂q2
= 0 if the inequality ∂
2∆2η2
∂q2
2 > −2 holds for
the solution of equilibrium condition. Solving for the
2Nash equilibrium yields the equilibria,
q∗1 =
k − q∗2
2
, (4)
where q∗2 is the nonnegative root of the equation
q∗2 = max[
k
3
− 2
3
∂∆2η2
∂q∗2
, 0]. (5)
Thereafter, it is assumed Eq.(5) has unique nonnegative
root. In the above derivations, it has been assumed ∆2η2
is differentiable and simultaneously ∂
2∆2η2
∂q∗
2
2 > −2. One
will find the sign of δ(q∗2) ≡ ∂∆
2η2
∂q∗
2
plays a crucial role in
the Nash equilibria, which determines the degree of the
strategic asymmetry in the game.
In what follows, let us consider some specific cases
corresponding to zero, negative, and positive values of
δ(q∗2). For example, in the case 1 with ∆
2(η2) = const.,
we have δ(q∗2) = 0, q
∗
1 = q
∗
2 =
k
3 , and u1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) =
u2(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) + ∆
2(η2) =
k2
9 .
For the case 2 with δ(q∗2) < 0 (namely the firm 2 can
improve its execution efficiency and precision with the
increase of the product manufactured), the firm 2 can
obtain more profit than the firm 1 if only
u1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2)− u2(q∗1 , q∗2) =
1
3
δ(q∗2)(k+ δ(q
∗
2)) +∆
2(η2) < 0.
(6)
In the case 3, we assume the Poisson distribution
D(q2, η2) = e
−q2 q2η2
η2!
. In this case, Q(q2) = 0, q
∗
1 =
min[k+13 ,
k
2 ], q
∗
2 = max[
k−2
3 , 0]. At this equilibrium the
payoffs for the firm i (i = 1, 2) are
u∗1 = min[
(k + 1)2
9
,
k2
4
],
u∗2 = max
2[
k − 2
3
, 0]. (7)
In the following section, it will be shown that this equi-
librium fails to be the optimal solution for most values
of the parameter k, because two firms could simultane-
ously achieve more payoff than the one in Eq.(7) from
the region D of Fig.3.
In the above discussion, the different execution preci-
sion of the strategies cause the asymmetry of the game.
Equivalently, different evaluation schemes for two firms
may result in the same asymmetric game. The above
asymmetric generalization of classical Cournot’s Duopoly
can not only be applied to economical and managemen-
tal fields, may also find its application in a class of two
”detector” systems, such as the 3D vision system. For
example, the self-regulating aperture or pupils play the
similar role as two firms in this game which control the
light intensity analoging with the qi (i = 1, 2) in Eq.(1);
CCD, CMOS or retina play the evaluation role; The clar-
ity or the signal noise ratio of the picture maybe have
monotonic relations with the payoffs in Eq.(1). As an in-
teresting illustration, there is no one owning the same left
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FIG. 1: (a) The scaled Nash equilibrium strategy x∗21 /k of the
firm 1 and (b) the scaled Nash equilibrium strategy x∗22 /k of
the firm 2 at Nash equilibrium are plotted as the function of
1/k and γ. When cos(2γ) = 1
k−1
, the transition-like behaviors
occur.
and right eyes, and the brain of human being will control
two pupils, and simultaneously coordinate the informa-
tion received by left and right retina. Thus it is worthy
to investigate how the potential cooperation affects this
kind of asymmetric game.
II. SIMULATION SCHEME OF QUANTIZED
COURNOT’s DUOPOLY WITH DIFFERENT
MEASUREMENT APPARATUSES
Considering a simulation scheme for the quantized ver-
sion of above asymmetric game of the case 3, two single-
mode optical fields which are initially at the vacuum state
|0〉1⊗ |0〉2 are sent to firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. the
strategic moves of firm 1 and firm 2 are represented by
the displacement operators Dˆ1 and Dˆ2 locally acted on
their individual optical fields. The firms are restricted to
choose their strategies from the sets
Si = {Dˆi(xi) = exp[
√
2
2
xi(a
†
i − ai)]|xi ∈ [0,∞)}, i = 1, 2
(8)
where ai and a
†
i are the annihilation and creation opera-
tors of the ith mode optical field. In this stage, the state
of the game becomes a direct product of two coherent
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FIG. 2: (a) The scaled payoff U1/k
2 of the firm 1 and (b)
the scaled payoff U2/k
2 of the firm 2 at Nash equilibrium are
plotted as the function of 1/k and γ.
states |
√
2
2 x1〉 and |
√
2
2 x2〉,
|ψ〉 = |
√
2
2
x1〉 ⊗ |
√
2
2
x2〉. (9)
Having executed their moves, firm 1 and firm 2 forward
their optical fields containing enough coherent pulses to
the final measurement, prior to which a beam splitter op-
eration Jˆ(γ) = exp[iγ(a†1a2+a
†
2a1)] (γ ∈ [0, pi4 )) is carried
out. Therefore the final state prior to the measurement
can be expressed as
|Ψ〉 = |
√
2
2
x1 cos γ +
√
2
2
ix2 sin γ〉
⊗|
√
2
2
x2 cos γ +
√
2
2
ix1 sin γ〉. (10)
Next the measurement on the photon number of the opti-
cal fields is carried out, which is usually done by photon-
detector. We focus on the asymmetric game in which
the judge uses different detecting apparatuses to mea-
sure the final quantities of two firms. ”classical” mea-
suring apparatus is assigned to firm 1, which can only
give out the expected values of the photon numbers of
the optical fields such as the optical power meter. Quan-
tum measuring apparatus is assigned to firm 2, such as
the highly sensitive quantum photon-counter which can
measure the photon number and its distribution of the
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FIG. 3: The distinct regions corresponding to the increase
or decrease of the individual payoffs of two firms at Nash
equilibrium and their total payoff. The payoff U∗1 increases
with γ in region D and decreases with γ in combined region
A+B+C; The payoff U∗2 increases with γ in combined regions
B+C+D and decreases with γ in region A; The total payoff
U∗1 + U
∗
2 increases with γ in region C+D and decreases with
γ in combined region A+B.
quantum optical fields. For the final state in Eq.(10),
the expected value of the photon number of the firm 1 is
n1 =
1
2 (x
2
1 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ). The photon number of the
optical field of the firm 2 is the non-negative integer m2
with the Poisson probability distribution Pm2 given by
Pm2 = e
− 1
2
(x2
2
cos2 γ+x2
1
sin2 γ)
(12 (x
2
2 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ))m2
m2!
. (11)
. The average payoffs are given by
uQi (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) = 〈ui(n1,m2)〉, (12)
where
〈ui(n1,m2)〉 =
∞∑
m2=0
ui(n1,m2)Pm2 (13)
denotes the average of ui(n1,m2) taken over all possible
values of m2 with the Poisson distribution Pm2 . It is still
assumed a and c tend to infinity but keeping k = a−c ≥ 1
a finite constant. Thus the quantum payoffs for two firms
are obtained as
uQ1 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x21 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ)[k − 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)],
uQ2 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ)[k − 1− 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)].(14)
Here, when Jˆ(γ) = I (the identity operator), the scheme
can return to the case 3 in the classical asymmetric
Cournot’s Duopoly, in which quantum fluctuation of the
optical field causes the reduce of the payoffs of firm 2.
Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields the unique one
x∗21 =
2 cos2(γ)[k + sec(2γ)]
2 + cos(2γ)
x∗22 =
2 cos2(γ)[k − 1− sec(2γ)]
2 + cos(2γ)
(15)
4under the condition of cos(2γ) ≥ 1
k−1 , and
x∗21 = k,
x∗22 = 0 (16)
under the condition of cos(2γ) < 1
k−1 . In Fig.1, the
scaled Nash equilibrium strategies of two firms are plot-
ted as the function of γ and 1/k. The profits of two firms
in Nash equilibrium can be easily derived by substituting
Eq.(15) or Eq.(16) into Eq.(14).
U∗1 =
cos2(γ)[1 + 2k + cos(2γ)]2
4(2 + cos(2γ))2
U∗2 =
cos2(γ)[3 − 2k + cos(2γ)]2
4(2 + cos(2γ))2
(17)
when cos(2γ) ≥ 1
k−1 , and
U∗1 =
1
4
k2 cos2(γ),
U∗2 =
1
4
k(k − 2) sin2(γ) (18)
when cos(2γ) < 1
k−1 . U
∗
1 increases with γ if both k > 5
and cos(2γ) > 2k−5−
√
4k2−20k+9
2 are simultaneously sat-
isfied. Otherwise, U∗1 decreases with γ. U
∗
2 increases
with γ if k > 2 and decreases with γ if 1 ≤ k < 2. When
k = 2, the payoff of the firm 2 at the Nash equilibrium
is always zero. In Fig.2, the scaled payoffs of two firms
at Nash equilibrium are depicted. The extraordinary as-
pects of the present asymmetric case are very distinct
from the original symmetric game. The payoffs are not
only related to the value of γ, but also dependent on the
value of k. A second-order transition-like behavior of the
payoffs occurs at the points satisfying cos(2γ) = 1
k−1 ,
which results from the asymmetry of the game. For the
firm 1 assigned a classical evaluation, its payoff at the
Nash equilibrium is always larger than the one of firm 2.
As k increases, the degree of asymmetry decreases which
causes the scaled payoffs U1/k
2 and U2/k
2 to become
closer to each other. When cos(2γ) ≥ 1
k−1 , we have
U∗1 + U
∗
2 =
cos2(γ)[11 + 8k(k − 1) + 8 cos(2γ) + cos(4γ)]
4(2 + cos(2γ))2
U∗1 − U∗2 =
cos2(γ)(2k − 1)
2 + cos(2γ)
, (19)
and when cos(2γ) < 1
k−1 ,
U∗1 + U
∗
2 =
1
4
k(k − 1 + cos(2γ))
U∗1 − U∗2 =
1
4
k(1 + (k − 1) cos(2γ)). (20)
The region in the plane of cos(2γ) and 1/k for the in-
crease of the total payoff has been clearly indicated in
Fig.3. It is interesting to quantificationally analyze how
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FIG. 4: (a) The scaled total payoff (U1 + U2)/k
2 of the firms
and (b) the scaled payoff difference (U1 −U2)/k
2 of the firms
at Nash equilibrium are plotted as the function of γ and 1/k.
the asymmetry of the evaluation schemes affects the pay-
off. For it, we need a rational quantitative definition of
the asymmetry, symmetry and cooperation of the game.
Assuming s ≡ min[ 2
k
, 1] to be the degree of asymmetry
which varies from 1 to 0 for k ∈ [1,∞), and s¯ = 1−s to be
the degree of symmetry. ξ ≡ 1−cos(2γ)1+cos(2γ) could be regarded
as the degree of cooperation. Then, the expression of the
scaled payoff difference can be rewritten as
(U∗1 − U∗2 )/k2 =
1− 14 (1 + s¯)2
3 + ξ
(21)
when s¯ > ξ; Otherwise, when 0 < s¯ < ξ, the scaled payoff
difference is given by
(U∗1 − U∗2 )/k2 =
1
4
1− s¯ξ
1 + ξ
. (22)
For 0 = s¯ < ξ,
(U∗1 − U∗2 )/k2 =
1
4
1 + (2/k − 1)ξ
1 + ξ
. (23)
At the second-order transition boundary labeled by s¯ =
ξ,
(U∗1 − U∗2 )/k2 =
1
4
s,
(U∗1 + U
∗
2 )/k
2 =
1
4
1 + s¯2
1 + s¯
. (24)
5The sum and difference of the scaled payoffs of two firms
are plotted as the function of γ and 1/k in Fig.4.
Finally, we briefly discuss the physical realization of
present scheme. In realistic situation, two players may
initially have two single-mode laser diodes which can ra-
diate continuous coherent laser. Two players modulate
their laser intensity according to their individual strate-
gic moves and generate enough coherent pulses sequence.
Then the coherent pulse sequences pass a beam splitter
and are detected by the optical power meter and the high-
efficient quantum photon-detector, respectively. The op-
tical power meter gives out the average power of the co-
herent optical pulses. It is easy to transform the aver-
age power to the average photon number contained in
each pulse. The high-efficient quantum photon-detector
should distinguish the Fock states and record their cor-
responding probability distributions. Up to date, it is
still very difficult to experimentally implement multi-
photon detection with high enough efficiency. It has been
demonstrated a system capable of directly measuring
the photon-number state of a single pulse of light using
a superconducting transition-edge sensor microcalorime-
ter. The photon-number distribution of a weak pulsed-
laser source at 1550 nm has been verified [23]. A charge
integration photon detector that enables the efficient
measurement of photon number states at 1530nm wave-
lengths with a quantum efficiency of 80 percent has been
also presented [24].
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, we presented an asymmetric generaliza-
tion of classical Cournot’s duopoly game, and proposed
the simulation scheme of its quantized version, in which
the player assigned by a ’classical’ measurement scheme
always wins the player assigned by a quantum measure-
ment scheme. Due to the common affection of the asym-
metric evaluation scheme, the cooperation induced by the
beam splitter, and the marginal effect of strategic space,
there exists a second-order transition-like behaviors of
the payoffs at Nash equilibrium. At the transition bound-
ary, the symmetry and the cooperation become balanced,
and the scaled payoff difference is proportional to the de-
gree of asymmetry of the game.
This simulation scheme is symmetric photon-loss free,
namely the symmetric photon-loss does not alter the
unique property of this quantized asymmetric Cournot’s
duopoly. If both two firms have the complete information
about the photon loss, they can adjust their strategies
according to the transformation xi → xie κ2 t (κ denotes
the photon loss rate), which can guarantee the final pay-
offs are invariant under the influence of the photon loss
process.
The Mandel Q parameter of the optical field heavily
affects the characteristics of this kind of the games. In
the noncooperation case with ξ = 0, if two players adopt
certain kind of optical field fulfilling the inequality (6) as
the carrier of their strategic moves, the player assigned by
high-efficient quantum photon-detector have the chance
to win. While for ξ 6= 0, the cases become more compli-
cated and will be analyzed in future work.
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